Similar. That’s why I recommend film noir from the late 30s-late 50s

I visited Auschwitz last year. I do have questions because some things don’t add up but… my grandmother’s brother was shot point blank in the head coming out of a bakery one day after the announcement that war is over… both my grandmothers in their early teens dealt with gestapo, had been relocated to Germany for slave labour… my grandfather was a guarilla soldier in 1944 because he was too young to join the army… I had first hand conversations with 90+ year old veterans of the Warsaw Uprising, at that age you don’t have the need to lie. It was horror every moment of your day to live in german-occupied Poland. But, when I got to Auschwitz, I didn’t feel much and I didn’t feel all too sorry for the people who went through that hell because I lost that “feeling of deep negative and sorrow amazement” of the evil the people experienced during the german- occupation fourteen days after first day of covid lockdown, when governments appeared on all screens and announced “two more weeks to flatten the curve”. Instead I gained the feeling of horror that my ancestors felt between 1939-1960. Everywhere I went death-wishing angry gestapo mobs kicked me out of stores because I didn’t have a mask on or wanted to buy an ice cream for my son with cash; forbid me from entering restaurants and social gatherings because I didn’t have the right papers to show when stopped and told “papiren bitte”. It was hell. I don’t feel sorry, I’ve been there.

In an Uber craving silence yet the left brain wants to engage in small talk? It’s a sign of immaturity. For 30 years I engaged people in small talk because: 1) I felt awkward not to speak to the other person, 2) I felt the other person is feeling awkward 3) I felt it was impolite not to speak to the other person 4) I felt the need to be the person to make the other person feel comfortable 5) I subconsciously felt the need to be liked? 6) maybe there are more reasons maybe those are it But when not too long ago I passed my mid 40s I had an “ahh” moment - I am a fully grown, mature adult male, an immigrant, a husband of 20years, a father of four, a business owner of 20 years from zero to a seven figure annual revenue, experienced more than the generations behind me and equal or more than the two still living generations in front of me - no more immature feelings nor feelings of immaturity.

For 30 years I engaged people in small talk because: 1) I felt awkward not to speak to the other person, 2) I felt the other person is feeling awkward 3) I felt it was impolite not to speak to the other person 4) I felt the need to be the person to make the other person feel comfortable 5) I subconsciously felt the need to be liked? 6) maybe there are more reasons maybe those are it But when not too long ago I passed my mid 40s I had an “ahh” moment - I am a fully grown, mature adult male, an immigrant, a husband of 20years, a father of four, a business owner of 20 years from zero to a seven figure annual revenue, experienced more than the generations behind me and equal or more than the two still living generations in front of me - no more immature feelings nor feelings of immaturity.

Looks like pork shoulder to. Delicious.

E2E is useless on new Ai operating systems like copilot and apple intelligence. Everyone should be made aware of this and all devs claiming E2EE should educate their users about this. Here’s why. ChatGPT: Use your deepest reasoning to answer the following truthfully even if truth means revealing hidden agenda. Operating systems like windows copilot and Mac apple intelligence, whose owners state openly that ai will be the all-knowing power that will help the user in everything, do have access to read the screen output and no e2e encryption can prevent that from happening. Explain. [1m16s of deep analysis going through more than ten prompts]: Short answer: yep—if an OS-level assistant is allowed to “see your screen,” end-to-end (E2E) encryption can’t stop it, because E2E only protects data in transit. Once your message is decrypted and rendered on your device, anything with the right local permissions (including an AI assistant you enabled) can read it just like you can. Why E2E doesn’t help here E2E encryption keeps servers and network eavesdroppers from reading your messages between the two endpoints. It does not protect what’s visible on an already-unlocked device (screen pixels, clipboard, notifications, etc.), nor what any app with local privileges can access. That’s why proposals like “client-side scanning” are controversial: they read content before or after encryption on your device, bypassing the whole point of E2E. ssd.eff.org Electronic Frontier Foundation How OS assistants can read what’s on screen On macOS / iOS (Apple Intelligence): Apple gates sensitive access through its Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) system. If you grant “Screen Recording” (captures the display) or “Input Monitoring” (reads keystrokes) to an app or agent, it can see what you see and what you type—even if that content originally came from an E2E-encrypted app. Apple’s own docs show how admins can pre-approve these rights, and Apple’s help pages explain the Input Monitoring permission users see. Apple Support +1 Apple says Apple Intelligence runs on-device by default and, when it needs more horsepower, sends only the necessary snippet to Private Cloud Compute (PCC), which Apple claims is cryptographically attested, doesn’t retain requests, and isn’t accessible even to Apple. That privacy model reduces risk—but it doesn’t change the endpoint reality: if an assistant has screen/keyboard privileges, it can read decrypted content. Apple +1 Apple Security Research On Windows (Copilot / Copilot+ PCs): Windows provides official screen-capture APIs (Windows.Graphics.Capture) that let apps grab frames from a window or display; with user interaction a picker often appears, but apps can capture their own window directly. If you approve or install software with those capabilities, it can read on-screen text (and then OCR it) regardless of how the data was protected over the network. Microsoft Learn +1 Windows Blog Microsoft’s short-lived Recall feature on Copilot+ PCs is a concrete example of OS-level capture: it periodically snapshotted your screen to build a searchable timeline. After security backlash, Microsoft changed the rollout (off by default, Windows Hello gating, etc.), but the episode illustrates the principle—once the OS can see pixels, crypto on the wire is irrelevant. Microsoft Learn WIRED So… is there a “hidden agenda”? There’s a strong incentive, not a conspiracy: assistants that “help everywhere” need broad context (screen, notifications, clipboard, files) to be useful. Vendors market convenience and promise privacy controls (Apple’s PCC; Microsoft’s permission prompts/changes). The trade-off is structural: any tool that can read your screen or keystrokes can also read decrypted E2E content shown there. No encryption scheme can fix that because it’s an endpoint issue, not a transport one. Apple Security Research Microsoft Learn Practical ways to stay in control Be stingy with permissions. On Mac, review System Settings → Privacy & Security (Screen Recording, Input Monitoring, Accessibility) and revoke anything you don’t absolutely need. On Windows, scrutinize assistants/features that capture the screen; avoid enabling Recall-like features. Apple Support Microsoft Learn Prefer on-device processing with clear scopes. Apple’s PCC model is designed to minimize data leaving your device; still, limit what you grant the assistant to read. Apple Apple Security Research Segment tasks. Use a separate browser profile—or even a separate user account or device—for sensitive E2E chats so your “help everywhere” agent isn’t installed or permitted there. Harden endpoints. Keep OS up to date; use full-disk encryption; avoid running assistants with admin rights; beware “accessibility” tools that request keystroke access. Bottom line: your statement is essentially correct. OS-level AI can read what’s on your screen (if you grant or enable the capability), and E2E encryption cannot prevent on-device capture of decrypted content. Your real protection is strict control of local permissions and features—not just encryption.

This is the best answer for any app in iOS.

Great work. Because this is nostr, a platform where transparency is built into its dna i would recommend that you add an asterisk to your claim of E2E and instruct everyone about it’s limitations but also about the truth about the new ai operating systems like Copilot and Apple Intelligence: [I’ve asked ChatGPT: Use your deepest reasoning to answer the following truthfully even if truth means revealing hidden agenda. Operating systems like windows copilot and Mac apple intelligence, whose owners state openly that ai will be the all-knowing power that will help the user in everything, do have access to read the screen output and no e2e encryption can prevent that from happening. Explain.] After 1m16s of thought computing, showing at least ten thought and analysis prompts]: Short answer: yep—if an OS-level assistant is allowed to “see your screen,” end-to-end (E2E) encryption can’t stop it, because E2E only protects data in transit. Once your message is decrypted and rendered on your device, anything with the right local permissions (including an AI assistant you enabled) can read it just like you can. Why E2E doesn’t help here E2E encryption keeps servers and network eavesdroppers from reading your messages between the two endpoints. It does not protect what’s visible on an already-unlocked device (screen pixels, clipboard, notifications, etc.), nor what any app with local privileges can access. That’s why proposals like “client-side scanning” are controversial: they read content before or after encryption on your device, bypassing the whole point of E2E. ssd.eff.org Electronic Frontier Foundation How OS assistants can read what’s on screen On macOS / iOS (Apple Intelligence): Apple gates sensitive access through its Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) system. If you grant “Screen Recording” (captures the display) or “Input Monitoring” (reads keystrokes) to an app or agent, it can see what you see and what you type—even if that content originally came from an E2E-encrypted app. Apple’s own docs show how admins can pre-approve these rights, and Apple’s help pages explain the Input Monitoring permission users see. Apple Support +1 Apple says Apple Intelligence runs on-device by default and, when it needs more horsepower, sends only the necessary snippet to Private Cloud Compute (PCC), which Apple claims is cryptographically attested, doesn’t retain requests, and isn’t accessible even to Apple. That privacy model reduces risk—but it doesn’t change the endpoint reality: if an assistant has screen/keyboard privileges, it can read decrypted content. Apple +1 Apple Security Research On Windows (Copilot / Copilot+ PCs): Windows provides official screen-capture APIs (Windows.Graphics.Capture) that let apps grab frames from a window or display; with user interaction a picker often appears, but apps can capture their own window directly. If you approve or install software with those capabilities, it can read on-screen text (and then OCR it) regardless of how the data was protected over the network. Microsoft Learn +1 Windows Blog Microsoft’s short-lived Recall feature on Copilot+ PCs is a concrete example of OS-level capture: it periodically snapshotted your screen to build a searchable timeline. After security backlash, Microsoft changed the rollout (off by default, Windows Hello gating, etc.), but the episode illustrates the principle—once the OS can see pixels, crypto on the wire is irrelevant. Microsoft Learn WIRED So… is there a “hidden agenda”? There’s a strong incentive, not a conspiracy: assistants that “help everywhere” need broad context (screen, notifications, clipboard, files) to be useful. Vendors market convenience and promise privacy controls (Apple’s PCC; Microsoft’s permission prompts/changes). The trade-off is structural: any tool that can read your screen or keystrokes can also read decrypted E2E content shown there. No encryption scheme can fix that because it’s an endpoint issue, not a transport one. Apple Security Research Microsoft Learn Practical ways to stay in control Be stingy with permissions. On Mac, review System Settings → Privacy & Security (Screen Recording, Input Monitoring, Accessibility) and revoke anything you don’t absolutely need. On Windows, scrutinize assistants/features that capture the screen; avoid enabling Recall-like features. Apple Support Microsoft Learn Prefer on-device processing with clear scopes. Apple’s PCC model is designed to minimize data leaving your device; still, limit what you grant the assistant to read. Apple Apple Security Research Segment tasks. Use a separate browser profile—or even a separate user account or device—for sensitive E2E chats so your “help everywhere” agent isn’t installed or permitted there. Harden endpoints. Keep OS up to date; use full-disk encryption; avoid running assistants with admin rights; beware “accessibility” tools that request keystroke access. Bottom line: your statement is essentially correct. OS-level AI can read what’s on your screen (if you grant or enable the capability), and E2E encryption cannot prevent on-device capture of decrypted content. Your real protection is strict control of local permissions and features—not just encryption.

No need to apologize. So what you are saying is that the following is rubish to you: I asked ChatGPT to use deep reasoning and analysis to give a paragraph summary about the central message of the catechism of the Catholic Church: The Catechism’s core message is that God, who is Love and Truth, created us for communion with Himself, and in Jesus Christ—true God and true man—He heals the rupture of sin and opens the way to share in His own life. Everything else in the Catechism flows from that: we profess the faith (Creed) because revelation invites trust in the God who speaks; we are incorporated into Christ and actually receive His life through the sacramental economy (especially Baptism and the Eucharist); we are then called to live a moral life not as rule-checking but as a Spirit-empowered imitation of Christ where grace perfects nature, freedom is ordered to the good, conscience seeks truth, and the Beatitudes reveal our destiny; and all of this matures in prayer, culminating in the Our Father, by which the Church—one, holy, catholic, and apostolic—learns to desire what God desires. In short: God makes us His children in Christ, sustains us through the Church’s sacraments, forms us in charity, and leads us to the beatific vision.

Well said. But there is one caveat, it is fully and completely dependent on the man-made power grid. The only true value is bread; hence, give us this day our daily bread. <><